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In this paper, we track fiscal authority behaviour in the ten new EU member states (NSM) in 
the period which immediately preceded their EU accession. We first present basic stylized 
facts about public budgets of those countries. The paper then analyses reasons which led to 
periods of fiscal consolidation in the NMS. Secondly, we also present evidence from Pre-
Accession Economic and Convergence programmes of NMSs concerning planned steps of the 
fiscal authorities and try to contrast them with reality. Throughout the paper, we identify two 
different groups of countries which significantly differ in their fiscal behaviour. On the one 
side is the group of Baltic countries, displaying strong reform effort and responsible fiscal 
policy usually supported by strong economic growth. On the second extreme, we identify 
fiscally irresponsible central European countries and two Mediterranean islands displaying lax 
fiscal policies and little political will to implement costly reforms. Somewhere between stand 
Slovenia and Slovakia, first without a strong reform performance yet with budget deficits in 
compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact and later with recent reform efforts. 
Our key finding concerning the behaviour of the fiscally irresponsible group of countries is 
that their current problems with high budget deficits originate in their lax approach and 
inability to implement politically costly expenditure cuts which is apparent from their revision 
of budget plans and endeavour to shift envisioned deficit reductions into the future. Yet, this 
strategy has led those countries to an uncomfortable position vis-à-vis European fiscal rules. 
JEL Code: E6, E62, H6, H87. 
Keywords: fiscal policy, new member states, consolidations, Stability and Growth Pact, 
excessive deficit procedure, convergence programmes. 
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responsibility. 1. INTRODUCTION 
Ten countries joined the European Union (EU) in May of 2004.
1 All ten have declared 
that they will adopt the common European currency – the euro – as soon as possible. To that 
end, the ten must adjust their economic policies, namely monetary and fiscal policies. So far, 
it is fiscal policy that proves to be the more challenging. Some of the NMSs run fiscal deficits 
that are higher than the 3% of GDP limit prescribed by the European Union’s Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). Indeed, six out of the ten have found themselves in the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) as soon as they entered the EU.
2
The fiscal policy proves to be more difficult for authorities to control exactly because 
of its political connotations. Governments have found it very difficult to convince the 
electorates that fiscal consolidations are in their interest. Various governments have indeed 
collapsed amid fiscal reforms introduced or merely discussed. 
Two groups of countries have emerged among the NMSs. Six out of the ten NMSs 
(Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia) did not manage to cut their 
general government deficits
3 below 3 % of GDP and thus has been found to violate prescripts 
of SGP and has been subsequently put under EDP in July 2004.
4 Four countries (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia), on the other hand, fare rather well vis-à-vis the SGP rules 
and have very low government debts. 
In this paper, we look at the political factors that may have influenced governments’ 
vigour in fiscal policy conduct. We differentiate NMSs into two groups – those in breach of 
the SGP (EDP countries) and those complying with it (non EDP countries) – and show 
different fiscal policy’s dynamics in these two groups. We try to separate factors that led 
successful consolidations in the NMSs. Using detailed data, we illustrate how (in)consistent 
governments have been in their fiscal plans. We find that governments have regularly re-
scaled their fiscal programmes submitted to the European Commission (EC). And we do find 
that the countries breaching the SGP have raised their deficit expectations more frequently 
and by greater margin than countries complying with the SGP. Those fiscally more profligate 
governments also tend to get more and more ambitious in their consolidation plans, as they 
struggle to convince the EU authorities that they will indeed be able to join the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) in a due time. 
                                                 
1 The ten countries are Cyprus (CY); Czech Republic (CZ); Estonia (EE); Hungary (HU); Latvia (LV); 
Lithuania (LT); Malta (MT); Poland (PL); Slovenia (SI); and Slovakia (SK). All became members of the 
European Union in May 2004 and we will call them throughout the paper New Member States (NMSs). Only 
Cyprus and Malta had not been members of the socialist, Soviet-run system that collapsed in 1989. 
2 See Schneider and Zápal (2005) for a detailed discussion. 
3 In what follows, when we refer to government, we mean always general government. 
4 All NMSs with respect to SGP are classified as “member states with derogation”, which means that 
those countries are expected to comply with SGP limits for government budget deficit of 3 % GDP and 
government debt of 60 % of GDP. Although they can not be fined for breaching those limits, they are put under 
EDP and subsequent intensified fiscal surveillance process and can be prohibited to draw financial resources 
from EU Cohesion Fund (see European Commission (2004a), pp. 69-72, for details). Awareness of NMSs of the 
fact that they would be obliged to comply with SGP rules is apparent from Pre-Accession Economic 
Programmes for year 2001. 
- 1 - Throughout the paper, we present data from European Commission (2004b) which 
span till 2006 so clarification is needed as to where predicted values for 2005 and 2006 come 
from. Current practice is such that all member states are obliged to participate in so called 
fiscal notification, during which government officials of corresponding country present up-to-
date facts and data about the development of their budgets to European Commission and 
EUROSTAT officials. Fiscal notifications take place twice a year in spring and autumn. 
Based on information submitted from member states, EC prepares forecast for next year or 
two. 
Thus data we use are based on autumn 2004 fiscal notification and therefore for year 
2004 present expected values and for years 2005 and 2006 present predictions of EC, based 
on 2004 autumn information. Although collected according to unified methodology, all the 
data should be treated with caution since they might possibly be inadequate due to low 
experience of statistical departments and officers in NMSs or due to methodological 
ambiguity regarding “nonstandard” operations in NMSs’ budgets. 
Other source of information we relied on were Pre-Accession Economic Programmes 
(PEPs)
5 of NMSs and Convergence Programmes (CoPrs)
6 of NMSs. Both PEPs and CoPrs 
lay out plans of governments in NMSs how to consolidate their budget deficits. The existence 
of various plans allows us to compare fiscal plans and results these plans achieved. 
Bearing all the qualifications in mind, we proceed as follows. In the next part, we 
present very brief discussion of fiscal policy position of the new member states and the “old” 
fifteen member states of the EU. We illustrate that countries differed in the vigour with which 
they controlled spending programmes. The third chapter analyses factors of successful 
consolidations and shows that the EU’s pressure has been an important factor. 
The fourth chapter is devoted to detailed and comprehensive analysis of the ten NMSs 
fiscal plans as reflected in their PEPs and CoPrs. Namely, we illustrate how fiscal plans 
changed over time and how governments regularly missed their fiscal targets. 
The fifth chapter summarises our findings on individual countries’ fiscal plans and 
confirms that higher deficits have led consequently to greater revisions and more ambitious 
plans for future – as opposed to actually delivered – consolidations. Sixth part brings an 
attempt to quantify “quality” and reform-mindness of the ten NMSs. The seventh chapter 
briefly concludes the paper and discusses its contributions. 
II. STYLIZED FACTS 
In this section, we briefly present some basic data on the NMSs’ fiscal domain. For a 
more detailed discussion see Schneider and Zápal (2005). As the chart 1a illustrates, the 
                                                 
5 All NMSs submitted their Pre-Accession Economic Programmes in years 2001, 2002 and 2003. We 
refer to them as PEP01, PEP02 and PEP03 respectively and add country specific suffix where needed for the 
sake of clarity (therefore PEP01-CZ refers to PEP of Czech Republic submitted in year 2001). All PEPs 
presented, among other things, information about fiscal policy in NMSs, its objectives and plans for upcoming 
period as well as information about structural reforms under way and about those needed or expected. 
6 All NMSs submitted one exceptional Convergence Programme in spring 2004 and regular 
Convergence Programme in autumn 2004. We refer to them as CoPr-spring and CoPr-autumn respectively, again 
adding country specific suffix when needed (therefore CoPr-spring-CZ refers to Convergence Programme of 
Czech Republic submitted to EC in spring 2004). CoPrs follow in structure PEPs, though somehow reduced. 
- 2 - NMSs have differed in the conduct of fiscal policy. Estonia has never had a bigger deficit 
than 3,7 % in one exceptional year; similarly Slovenia has crossed the 3 % threshold just once 
in 2000. Other countries have run much more adventurous fiscal policy; the biggest deficit in 
the Czech Republic and in Slovakia was 12 % of GDP, 10 % in Malta and 9 % in Hungary. 
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The ten NMSs also differ in the size of their respective governments’ budgets. The 
two groups of countries emerge: small and big governments. The group of small(ish) 
governments consists of the three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and 
Slovakia. The big consists of the remaining six countries: Central European four (Czech 
Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia) plus two little Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and 
Malta. While the former group now (in 2004) spends 36-38 % of their respective GDPs 
through the government, the latter group is characterised by the government share of 46-52 % 
in GDP. The gap is thus noticeable and significant – see the chart 1b. 
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We can thus speculate that there are two groups of countries within the ten NMSs. One 
relies on higher government expenditures and runs more pronounced budget deficits. This 
group consists of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Cyprus and Malta. The second group, 
represented by the three Baltic republics – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – is characterised by 
lower government budget share in GDP and by low budget deficits. The two countries are 
somewhat between these two groups: Slovenia has high and stable government expenditures, 
but it still manages to keep its budget deficit under control. Slovakia, on the other hand, used 
to be synonymous with unsustainable fiscal policy, but has turned out to be the most fervour 
- 3 - reformer within the NMSs. It has eliminated a substantial part of government expenditures 
and limited its budget deficits within the reach of the SGP limit of 3 % of GDP. 
Composition of the budget 
Alternative way how to approach government budget is to look at the composition of 
the budget itself. Since there is little variability in this respect over time we include only 
relevant averages. First table shows composition of the revenues in NMSs. 
Table 1a: Composition of government budgets in NMSs and EUR-15, 
revenue averages for 1995-2006 
  EDP 
countries
non EDP 
countries EUR-15 NMS 
Indirect taxes  32,4 34,4 29,2 33,2 
of which VAT
7 17,0 21,6 14,1 18,8 
of  which  Excises  7,6 8,2 6,0 7,9 
Direct  taxes  22,2 22,7 28,9 22,4 
of  which  PIT  12,2 17,7 21,3 14,4 
of  which  CIT  8,3 4,1 5,5 6,6 
Social  contributions  28,3 28,4 31,7 28,4 
Memo item: 
Total revenue, % of GDP  42,6  38,0  46,1  40,6 
Source: European Commission (2004b); Authors’ calculations 
Although EDP and non EDP countries do not differ significantly in the composition of 
their budgets when divided into indirect taxes, direct taxes and social security contributions, 
recall that government revenue in EDP countries is approximately 4 % of GDP higher than in 
non EDP countries which implies that although the composition of the budget revenues is 
similar, EDP countries burden more heavily on their economies in nominal terms. 
Notable differences between EUR-15 and NMSs are to be found in higher reliance on 
indirect taxation in NMSs given by especially higher reliance on VAT. Higher reliance on 
indirect taxes might reflect the fact that those taxes are more easily collectible and thus more 
appropriate source of revenues when tax officials are less skilled, as might be the case in 
NMSs. On the other hand, EUR-15 countries rely more on direct taxes which form almost 
third of their budgets. 
As regards differences between EDP and non EDP countries, the two groups have very 
similar revenue shares coming from indirect and direct taxes and from social contribution 
revenues. Certain differences stem from internal composition of indirect tax revenues where 
non EDP countries rely more on VAT and from internal composition of direct tax revenues, 
where EDP countries rely less on PIT and more on CIT revenues when compared to non EDP 
countries. 
Turning now to the expenditure structure of the budgets in NMSs, we also include 
only average figures for the whole period under consideration. 
                                                 
7 Abbreviations used for different types of taxes are: VAT for value added tax, CIT for corporate 
income tax and PIT for personal income tax. 
- 4 - Table 1b: Composition of government budgets in NMSs and EUR-15, 
expenditure averages for 1995-2006 
  EDP 
countries
non EDP 
countries EUR-15 NMS 
Employees' remuneration  22,7 28,5 22,7 25,0 
Collective  consumption  22,0 24,7 17,1 23,1 
Social transfers in kind  20,8  29,1  25,4  24,1 
Social transfers not in kind  27,1  28,3  34,3  27,6 
Interest  6,1 2,5 8,1 4,7 
Subsidies  3,9 2,7 2,7 3,4 
Investment  7,7 7,5 5,0 7,6 
Memo item: 
Total expenditure, % of GDP  47,5  39,6  48,3  44,2 
Note: Sum of expenditure items from collective consumption through investment plus non 
reported other category add up to 100 % of the budget. 
Source: European Commission (2004b); Authors’ calculations 
Noteworthy differences between NMSs and EUR-15 include lower expenditure for 
employees’ remuneration, public goods
8 and public investment in EUR-15 and higher 
expenditure for redistribution and interests in EUR-15, as compared to NMSs. This reveals 
the fact, that public sectors in NMSs are more labour intensive. Difference in public 
investment reflects higher needs for infrastructure projects financing in NMSs and a 
difference in interest payments reflects lower average indebtness of NMSs. 
As regards differences between EDP and non EDP countries, the EDP countries spend 
relatively less on employees’ remuneration, collective consumption and social transfers in 
kind, but more on subsidies and interest payments. Note also, that the sum of expenditure 
budget items (excluding public employees’ wages, a category that goes “across” other 
expenditure categories) forms 88 % of budgets in EDP countries and 95 % of budgets in non 
EDP countries reflecting the fact that often untransparent and non-standard budget operations 
and expenditure contained in “other” category form almost 12 % of budgets in EDP countries 
as opposed to 5 % of budgets in non EDP countries. 
Dynamics of expenditure categories 
Besides the share of expenditures in GDP, we find it useful to look at the dynamics of 
public expenditures in the NMSs and the EUR-15 as to assess why six out of ten NMSs 
currently face EDP. 
                                                 
8 In what follows, we use basic ESA95 expenditure categories, which are compensation of employees; 
collective consumption; social transfers in kind; social transfers other than in kind; interest; subsidies; and gross 
fixed capital formation. 
Compensation of employees is self-explanatory category. Collective consumption is defined as 
expenditure on those services, which are intended simultaneously for all members of the society, i.e. in more 
economic terms, it is the expenditure on provision of public goods. Social transfers in kind cover those 
expenditures through which government purchases and provides certain goods for some members of the society, 
while social transfers other than in kind cover those expenditures through which government grants certain aid to 
its members in cash. Again, in more economic terms, both types of social transfers can be regarded as 
redistribution expenditures. Interest are expenditures government pays to cover the costs of public borrowing and 
subsidies are government unrequited payments, mainly to producers. 
Note that collective consumption, both categories of social transfers, subsidies, interest as well as minor 
“other” category sum up to total current expenditure category we also use. Last ESA95 category is gross fixed 
capital formation or in more economic terms government investment, which with total current expenditure adds 
up to almost 100 % of the budget expenditure with rest formed by “other” items. 
- 5 - The charts 2a-2d presents the results of our exercise. The charts reveal several 
interesting patterns. First regards employees’ compensation which grew in the EUR-15 by 
approximately 1 % annually in real terms. In the NMSs employees’ remuneration rose 
considerably faster, especially in the period since 2001 through 2003. Chart 2a suggests that 
the EDP countries have relaxed its wage policies earlier (remuneration jumped by almost 10 
% in 2002), but the non-EDP countries followed with a healthy increase in remuneration of 8 
% in 2003. 
Similar story applies for other two expenditure items, collective consumption and for 
aggregation of both types of social transfers: 
the NMSs have witnessed much more 
volatile developments than the EUR-15, but 
on average, both expenditure items grew 
faster in the NMSs than in the EUR-15. 
Faster growth has also been slightly higher in 
EDP than in non EDP countries, suggesting 
that policy-makers in EDP countries 
followed more relaxed policies through the 
beginning of this decade. 
Last major expenditure item is the 
growth of gross fixed capital formation. 
Chart 2d illustrates that while investment 
grew healthily both in the EDP and non EDP 
countries, the non EDP countries feel now 
confident to envisage a rapid acceleration of 
public investment, while the EDP countries 
plan much cautiously. 
Taken charts 2a-2d together, they 
point to a more lax expenditure control in the 
EDP countries which has contributed to their 
non-compliance with the SGP. Especially in 
case of employees’ remuneration and both 
types of social transfers, real growth rates in 
EDP countries exceeded those in non EDP 
countries throughout the outset of this 
century. 
Development of growth rates in EDP 
countries also reveals something what could 
be called a SGP induced effect, which is clear 
when comparing real growth rates of 
expenditure items in years 2003 and 2004. 
Data indicate that all the EDP countries 
planned a massive slowdown of the expenditure growth, most likely in order to comply with 
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- 6 - SGP.
9 The non-EDP countries, on the other hand, have enjoyed the luxury of gradual 
slowdown of real growth rates of the expenditure items included without significant rush. It 
remains to be explained why the EDP countries did not react earlier and more orderly to 
raising fiscal difficulties. 
To sum up this section, EDP countries are those with significantly higher government 
involvement in the economy as measured by the share of revenues and expenditures to GDP. 
The EDP countries have aggravated their budget woes by allowing a faster growth of 
employees’ remuneration and both types of social transfers in the past. This higher growth 
rates have reversed lately, reflecting effort of the EDP countries to cut budget deficits. 
However, authorities in the EDP countries had waited until the very last moment before any 
action in this respect and then applying sudden stop strategy. The non EDP countries could 
afford a more gradual reduction in expenditures growth rates. Data also reveal that while 
major part of consolidation effort in EDP countries falls on employees’ remunerations and 
social transfers of both kinds, the EDP countries have also reined in their investment 
expenditures, limiting long-term growth prospects in order to comply with European fiscal 
rules. 
Therefore, current problems of EDP countries with SGP seem to be given by the mix 
of their larger governments’ involvement in the economy, by higher rigidity of their budgets, 
and by the fact that policy-makers in those countries has recently allowed for escalation of 
politically sensitive expenditure items. 
III. POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF SUCCESSFUL CONSOLIDATIONS 
Given the NMSs’ apparent difficulties in consolidating budget deficits, we analysed 
factors that contributed to successful fiscal consolidations. One possible important set of 
factors are exogenous to fiscal policy: strong economic growth lowers the probability of 
introduction of consolidation since it lowers budget deficit irrespective of governments’ 
actions while high or growing public debt levels increase the probability of introduction of 
consolidation. Outside factors can also be relevant, for example positive economic growth of 
main trading partners can support domestic economic growth and thus lower the probability 
of consolidation or peer pressure of consolidating neighbouring countries can increase the 
probability of consolidation. 
Second important set of factors are given more by internal political economy concerns. 
In this respect elections can postpone introduction of consolidation plans. We were also 
interested whether initiation of EDP would show to increase the probability of introduction of 
consolidation in NMSs. 
In accordance with the literature, we define period of fiscal consolidation as a period 
in which government primary budget deficit to GDP ratio (budget deficit less interest on 
public debt) improved by more than 1 % of GDP in the first year and improved in second and 
                                                 
9 The data for 2004 in this paper are based on „estimates“, i.e. they are not final yet and are subject to 
revisions. 
- 7 - later years.
10 Consolidation is said to last, until government primary budget deficit to GDP is 
being reduced. 
11
Based on our definition of consolidation, we created dummy variable with unity 
values in years of consolidation periods and run a probit model in order to see how different 
economic and political economy factors have contributed to consolidations in NMSs. For 
internal economic exogenous variables, we include growth position of domestic economy 
captured by output gap, GAP and government debt, DEBT. For external factors, we include 
average budget position of EUR-15, FISC_E and growth position of EUR-15 captured by 
output gap, GAP_E. For political economy factors, we include two dummies. First is dummy 
for EDP initiation with given NMS, EDP and second is a dummy which takes on value of 
unity in election years, EL (election year is defined as a year of general parliamentary 
elections when it took place in the second half of the year and year preceding when elections 
took place in the first half of the year). Results are given in the table 2. 
Table 2: Probit analysis of consolidations in NMSs, 1995-2006 
Dependent variable: Consolidations defined using  






































0,32   0,36  
Note: Estimates for NMSs for 1995 through 2006. Dependent variable dummy taking on unity in year 
when relevant country underwent fiscal consolidation. GAP is deference between actual and potential 
output. DEBT is public debt to GDP ratio. FISC_E is average fiscal position of EUR-15 (surplus with 
“+” sign) and GAP_E is average output gap of EUR-15. EDP is dummy which takes on value of unity 
in year when relevant country was under EDP. EL is dummy taking on value of unity in elections years 
(definition used in the text). Data from European Commission (2004b) and AMECO database. All 
economic data in levels and lagged one year. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant on 1 %, 
** significant on 5 % and * significant on 10 %. 
                                                 
10 We do not use definition of fiscal consolidation of Hagen, Hallett and Strauch (2001) because it is too 
restrictive and thus we would be able to identify only very few periods of fiscal consolidation in our data sample. 
Also, we do not use cyclically adjusted budget data because those are not readily available. See also Schneider 
and Zápal (2005) for analysis of composition of consolidations in NMSs. 
Further, we analysed the National Accounts for any consolidation period. The NA data which differ 
somehow in methodology from ESA95 data we use here and a gap would indicate possibility of creative 
accounting by national authorities being our major concern. Problem with National Accounts is that they differ 
in structure and it is not easy to extract general government expenditure without immediately crossing into 
ESA95 data. Main reason for this is that, just as National Account, ESA95 relies as much as possible on 
economically more meaningful accrual principle. Despite difficulties, we have found no considerable difference 
between development of fiscal data in National Accounts as opposed to ESA95 data. 
11 Consolidation identified according to our definition are CY 2000-2001, 2004-2006; CZ 1996-1997; 
2004-2006; EE 2000-2003; LV 1996-1997, 2000-2001; LT 2000-2002; HU 2003-2004; MT 2004-2006; PL 
2005-2006. 
- 8 - Probit model we estimated reveals that domestic economic conditions play a key role 
in that they have either positive or negative effect on probability of consolidation 
introduction. Estimated coefficients show, that growth of domestic economy has considerable, 
statistically significant and negative effect on probability of consolidation initiation. Also 
statistically significant although not notable effect has public debt level to GDP ratio. 
On the other hand, outside conditions we tried to capture in our model by inclusion of 
EUR-15 average output gap and fiscal stance do not have significant effect on probability of 
consolidation introduction. Similarly, elections do not have any effect on the probability of 
consolidation. 
Estimated coefficients of probit model also show that most pronounced, statistically 
significant and positive effect on consolidations had the initiation of EDP with NMSs. This 
finding suggests that the SGP and the EU’s procedures have essential disciplining effect on 
policy-makers in NMSs. As a corollary to this finding, the model also shows that policy-
makers waited until the last moment before EU accession before tackling the problem of 
growing budget deficits and also that there is an outside disciplining force needed in order to 
induce the very same policy-makers in NMSs to behave responsibly. 
IV. FISCAL PLANNING BY THE NMSs 
In this section we present brief description of fiscal policy in NMSs based on their 
PEPs and CoPrs.
12 We focus on major trends and influences on fiscal policy and try to track 
down key factors which influenced development of fiscal position in NMSs prior to their EU 
accession. 
As regard timing of submission of the mentioned documents, first set of PEPs from 
year 2001 was submitted in two rounds. First round (CY, CZ, EE, HU, LV) was submitted in 
May 2001 and second round (LT, MT, PL, SI, SK) in October 2001. Second and third set of 
PEPs was submitted by all NMSs jointly in August 2002 and 2003 respectively. All spring 
CoPrs were submitted in May 2004 and most of autumn CoPrs in November or December 
2004 with the exception of LT and SI who submitted their second CoPrs in January 2005. 
For official evaluation of ambitiousness and fulfilment of plans outlined in PEP01 
through PEP03 see European Commission (2002a), European Commission (2002b) and 
European Commission (2003a) respectively. For evaluation of CoPr-spring and CoPr-
autumns, decisions about EDP initiation and recommendations of explicit steps needed to 
bring budget deficits under control by EC, see its website. We also do not tackle issue of link 
of all submitted documents to national budgets of NMSs for which see discussion in 
Ylaoutinen (2004). 
To see how plans of NMSs changed during pre-accession period and how they 
compare to reality, we went through all the PEPs and CoPrs of NMSs and put outlined or 
planned trajectory of budget deficits into one single graph we present for each country. 
                                                 
12 The longer description of fiscal policy of each NMS appeared in original version of the paper. Since 
each NMS has been devoted roughly two pages of text, we present here only short version. However, longer 
version is available upon request from the authors. 
- 9 - Fiscal policy in Cyprus in period under consideration has been influenced by two key 
factors. First one is negative development after 
September 21
st, 2001 which hit small and tourist-
based Cypriot economy and had negative impact 
on government budget position. Second key factor 
has been repeated effort of government to 
consolidate its budget after loose fiscal policies in 
second half of 1990’s. Due to repeated mis-
implementation of envisioned consolidation 
measures, inability to cope with increasing 
defence, agricultural, old-age related or public employment spending, budget position kept 
deteriorating throughout the whole pre-accession period. The key reason behind this 
development has been lack of political will which resulted in apparent postponement of 
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Note: PEP 01 data based on GFS methodology. 
Czech Republic’s public finance position deteriorated from original position at the 
beginning of the decade mainly due to continuing 
pressure of social related expenditure and due to 
one-off transformation related costs. As a result, 
Czech government in 2003 introduced 
consolidation programme consisting of mix of 
revenue increasing and expenditure decreasing 
measures. However, impact of consolidation fell 
short of originally expected one due to slow 
implementation, especially of expenditure related 
steps. In future and most importantly, yet unreformed PAYG pension system combined with 
quickly ageing population will exert further pressure on Czech public finance. This will 
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Note: PEP 01 data based on GFS methodology. 
Estonia entered the new millennium with favourable budget position despite negative 
impact of Russian crisis. The country kept its 
strong reform focus, reforming its health and 
pension systems. Despite obvious short-term costs 
associated with those reforms, Estonia managed to 
keep its budget roughly in balance, with the 
exception of 2003 when a strong economic growth 
delivered a budgetary surplus. Estonian officials 
repeatedly stress balanced budget goal in all the 
documents submitted and seem to be aware of need to run responsible fiscal policy in order 
Estonia 
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13 Due to methodological treatment of government guarantees and their re-classification, government 
budget deficit for year 2003 has been recalculated in 2004 and reached above 12 % of GDP. Without the 
methodological change and subsequent recalculation, government budget deficit would stand at 5,6 % of GDP 
against which improvement should be measured. 
- 10 - not to threaten external macroeconomic balance and conflict with by non-flexible exchange 
arrangement restricted monetary policy. 
Hungary repeatedly revised its budget plans and postponed bringing budget deficit 
under 3 % of GDP required by SGP. Among major 
reasons cited, unexpectedly high pension 
expenditure, public employees’ wages, health 
related or social benefit expenditure repeatedly 
appear along with unexpected development of 
government debt servicing costs stemming from 
increasing interest rates required to protect pegged 
exchange rate. Despite several expenditure 
reducing steps implemented by Hungarian government during fiscal years of 2003 and 2004, 
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Latvian authorities envisioned gradual reduction of its already favourable budget 
deficit towards the balanced position at the time of 
PEP01 submission. Outlined plans have been 
repeatedly revised partly as a result of increase of 
defence, health or education expenditure and partly 
as a result of repeated reduction in several tax rates 
with resulting lower budget revenue. Despite this 
development, Latvia managed to keep its deficit 
below 3% SGP benchmark, being supported by 
strong economic growth. At the same time, several 
ongoing reforms, health and pension system reforms were implementedbeing probably the 
most important ones without throwing budget into higher deficits. More or less constant 
budget deficit combined with strong economic growth rises concerns about pro-cyclicality of 
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Note: PEP 01 data based on GFS methodology. 
Developments in Lithuania closely resemble those in Latvia. Originally envisioned 
reduction of budget deficit towards zero values 
was overridden by several tax rates reductions and 
list of expenditure increasing measures linked to 
ongoing health and pension systems reforms on the 
one hand and to increases in public employees’ 
enumeration, public investment or social transfers 
on the other. Due to strong economic growth 
Lithuania has kept its budget under 3 % SGP 
benchmark, but there are raising concerns about 
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Note: PEP 01 data based on GFS methodology. 
- 11 - Malta entered this decade with considerable budget deficit exceeding 6 % of GDP. 
However, as described in PEP01, this still 
represented an improvement compared to deficits 
experienced throughout second half of 1990’s. 
Consolidation programme launched by Maltese 
government aimed to bring budget deficit to more 
reasonable position has been only partly 
successful. Partly due to developments after 
September 21
st, 2001 and partly as a result of 
ongoing increases of expenditure on public employees’ wage bill, old-pensions expenditure 
and several one-off expenses on construction of new hospital or restructuring of publicly held 
Malta Shipyard Company, Malta has been unable to comply with SGP by the date of EU 
accession. Whether implementation of list of exhaustive measures intended to bring budget 
deficit in compliance with SGP outlined in CoPr-autumn eventually takes place and results in 
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Polish authorities expected further deterioration of budget deficit by the date of PEP01 
submission citing increasing inflation-indexed 
social benefits and public wages as well as planned 
reduction of CIT as a main reason and outlining 
public finance reform intended to tackle those 
problems. Inability to implement reform measures, 
further reduction of tax rates and unexpectedly 
high pension reform related costs resulted in 
revision of budget deficit trajectory and launch of 
EDP with Poland by the date of EU entry. In 
expectation of such development, CoPr-spring outlines comprehensive and explicit set of 
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Note: PEP 01 data based on GFS methodology. 
Slovenia has kept its budget deficit within 3 % SGP benchmark for the whole pre-
accession period, displaying mild tendency to 
revise its plans. Reasons behind deterioration of 
budget position can be found in growth of public 
employees’ wage bill and growth of indexed social 
benefits and transfers. To cope with those 
problems, Slovenia government negotiated new 
social agreement for the period 2003 through 2005 
which, among others, included new rules for 
public sector wage indexation. Similar attempt in direction of de-indexation and 
rationalization of system of social transfers has been made. On the other hand, reduction of 
PIT rates and change in corporate taxation code put budget under further pressure. Despite 
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- 12 - Slovakia experienced considerably high budget deficits throughout the beginning of 
the decade, mainly as a result of transformation 
related costs, rising pension and health care 
expenditure and short-fall of tax revenue. Yet, 
since 2003 Slovakia repeatedly displays strong 
reform efforts. Speedy reform of its pension 
system, ongoing decentralization of public finance, 
health reform, labour code reform, implementation 
of programme budgeting or introduction of 
comprehensive flat-tax schedule is worth noticing. 
Short-term related costs of some of those steps then lie behind apparent stability of budget 
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Note: PEP 01 data based on GFS methodology. 
V. MERIT OF FISCAL PLANS 
In the previous chapter we identified tendency of NMSs to revise their budget deficits 
from submission of one document to another and in most cases this revision has been an 
upward one. Those repeated revisions provide a unique research opportunity to analyse 
government fiscal policy’s consistency. 
This chapter draws on Strauch, Hallerberg and Hagen (2004) who look at revisions of 
budget deficit trajectories from CoPrs of EUR-15. We took budget deficit data from each PEP 
and CoPr of every NMS and computed average revision between two consecutive documents 
taking into account only those years, for which budget deficit has been included in both 
documents. This average revision from one document to another then allowed us to compute 
average revision of budget deficit in various NMSs countries and group of countries. 
First, we tested whether EDP countries revised their budgets more than non EDP 
countries. The second aspect we focused on was an impact of general parliamentary elections 
on the revisions. Combining these two criteria, we analysed whether elections’ impact differs 
in EDP and non EDP countries. Lastly, we examined whether there was any difference 
between different “categories” of official governments’ documents, i.e. between pre-accession 
economic plans (PEPs) and members’ convergence programmes (CoPrs) and whether this 
difference is the same for EDP and non EDP countries. The following table summarises our 
results and brings several interesting insights. 
- 13 - Table 3: Average revision of expected budget deficit 
EDP countries  0,55   Election years in EDP 
countries  1,43  
Non EDP countries  0,10   Non election years in EDP 
countries  0,38  
Difference 0,45
*** Difference 1,05 
***
Election years  0,72   Election years in non EDP 
countries  0,05  
Non election years  0,28   Non election years in non EDP 
countries  0,12  
Difference 0,44
** Difference -0,07   
Between PEP01 and PEP02  Between PEP03 and CoPr-spring 
EDP countries  0,48   EDP countries  0,56   
Non EDP countries  0,43   Non EDP countries  -0,28   
Difference 0,06
  Difference 0,85 
**
Between PEP02 and PEP03  Between CoPr-spring and CoPr-autumn 
EDP countries  1,33   EDP countries  -0,15   
Non EDP countries  0,33   Non EDP countries  -0,10   
Difference 1,00
*** Difference -0,05 
 
Note: *** significant on 1 %, ** significant on 5 % and * significant on 10 %. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PEPs and CoPrs of NMSs 
The table reveals significantly higher tendency for budget deficit revisions in EDP 
countries. Revisions also tend to be higher in cases when general parliamentary elections took 
place between dates of submission of two consecutive documents. What is, however, striking 
is the difference between the EDP and non EDP countries in this respect: elections seem to 
play no role in the non-EDP countries’ revisions, while the EDP countries hike their expected 
deficits massively after an election, as a new government puts all the blame on the previous 
administration. 
Revisions of budget deficits between different pairs of document also differ 
significantly. EDP countries revised their budget deficits by the largest amount between the 
submission of PEP02 and PEP03 and somehow less between submission of PEP01 and 
PEP02 and between the submission of PEP03 and CoPr-spring. Between CoPr-spring and 
CoPr-autumn then EDP countries revised their budget deficits downward, mainly as a result 
of additional measures that were taken in order to ensure that trajectory of budget deficit 
outlined in CoPr-spring and which forms binding limit in the EDP framework. This suggests 
that budgets of EDP countries are more prone to diverge from predicted values or that policy-
makers in EDP countries are slower or less dedicated to take corrective measures in case of 
such divergence.
14 Thus, one may speculate that the EU membership has increased quality 
and consistency of the EDP countries’ fiscal planning.  
On the other hand, non EDP countries revised their budget deficits upward between 
submission of PEP01 and PEP02 and between submission of PEP02 and PEP03 and 
downward between the submission of PEP03 and CoPr-spring and between the submission of 
CoPr-spring and CoPr-autumn, without any apparent need to comply with SGP. Again, one 
may conjecture that these countries did not need additional “peer pressure” from the EU. 
                                                 
14 In an accompanying paper (Schneider and Zápal (2005)), we found that EDP countries have 
significantly higher share of open-ended expenditure to GDP, i.e. higher share of government expenditure which 
is beyond direct control of politicians which can render budgets in EDP countries more susceptible to 
unexpected surprises. 
- 14 - The table 4 shows that the EDP governments were making their planned reductions of 
budget deficit more ambitious at the same time as they were failing to bring their existing 
deficits under control. The table shows average changes of budget deficit between the time of 
submission of relevant document and time four years ahead, again averaging over EDP and 
non EDP countries and different documents. 
Table 4: Envisioned reduction of government 
budget deficit four years ahead 
  EDP countries non EDP countries Difference
PEP01 1,70  0,53  1,17 
**
PEP02 2,03  0,35  1,68 
***
PEP03 2,63  0,45  2,18 
***
CoPr-spring 2,68  0,35  2,33 
***
CoPr-autumn 2,52  0,33  2,19 
***
Note: Envisioned reduction of government budget deficit to GDP ratio in 
four years period from the year of submission of relevant document.
 *** significant on 1 %, ** significant on 5 % and * significant on 10 %. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PEPs CoPrs of NMSs 
Non EDP countries on average aimed to reduce their budget deficit in four year period 
from the year of submission of different documents by 0,4 % of GDP and there is no 
significant change over time. On the other hand, tendency of policy-makers in EDP countries 
to envision faster consolidation had been increasing from the submission of PEP01 to 
submission of CoPr-spring and declined slightly in CoPr-autumn. Although the differences in 
envisioned speeds of consolidations in EDP countries are small, data show that policy-makers 
in those countries postponed unpopular consolidations solving the problem partly by outlined 
faster consolidations in future. 
Based on data in last two tables, we can construct average trajectory of budget deficit 
in EDP and non EDP countries. Taking 
average budget deficit in year 2001 for 
EDP and non EDP countries as the basis, 
we can construct starting point of each 
curve by adding average revision of budget 
deficit and determine its slope from 
envisioned budget deficit reduction. 
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Chart 3b: Average EDP country 
Non EDP countries remained for 
the period 2001 through 2004 below SGP 
3 % of GDP benchmark, although they 
revised their budget deficits as well.. At 
the same time, the slope of budget 
trajectoriy for the average non EDP 
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On the other hand, EDP countries 
were unable to reach the SGP limit due to 
their considerable revisions of budget  Source: Authors’ calculations based on PEPs and CoPrs of NMSs 
- 15 - deficits. They thus pushed the trajectory forward in time. At the same time, their planed 
consolidations were getting ever more ambitious, i.e. increasing the slope of the consolidation 
trajectory – see chart 3b. This steepening indicates that the EDP countries’ governments target 
ever more ambitious reforms as their starting positions keeps worsening. Thus, governments 
behave as in denial and keep promising improvement, ignoring their mis-performance in the 
past. 
One possible objection to our findings that EDP countries revise their budget deficit 
plans more often due rather to political economy concerns is that such a development might 
be driven by other factors. For example, higher tendency of EDP countries to revise their 
plans might be given by repetitive revision of macroeconomic predictions on which budget 
plans are based. If this were true, then our finding about higher tendency of EDP countries to 
revise their budget plans would reflect more quality of macroeconomic forecasting in EDP 
countries rather than political economy considerations. 
We checked this hypothesis by taking average budget deficit revision from between 
each pair of documents in each NMS and regressed it on set of factors, most importantly on 
average revision of predicted growth rate between the same pair of documents, GDP_R.
15 
Both measures of revisions are defined such that higher number means either revision of 
government budget deficit towards higher surplus (lower deficit) or revision of growth 
prospect towards higher growth rate. 
In our regression we included three political economy variables. First is the dummy 
which takes on value of unity when parliamentary elections took place between the 
submissions of relevant documents, EL. Second political economy variable is index of power 
of finance minister (MF) during budget preparation and implementation, P_MF, defined such 
that higher number captures more powerful finance minister. Values of P_MF were taken 
from Gregor (2004). Last political economy variable is interaction term between cabinet 
cohesion index, COH, constructed according to Roubini and Sachs (1989) methodology by 
Gregor (2004) with the growth prospect revision. Because index of cabinet cohesion as 
originally defined by Roubini and Sachs (1989) takes on lower values with greater cohesion, 
we use negative value of cohesion index based on the idea that higher expected growth 
(higher GDP_R) as well higher cabinet cohesion leads to improvement of budget prospects. 
Alternatively, lower expected growth as well as more fragmented governments might together 
lead to worsening of the budget picture given inability of fragmented governments in case of 
change in macroeconomic prospects. 
Last variable we include is the change in ratio of current account deficit to GDP, CA, 
so as to capture the external macroeconomic position of each NMSs. We defined our CA 
variable thus that higher and positive values denote improvement in current account, or in 
other words, improvement in external macroeconomic imbalance. Rationale for inclusion of 
change in current account deficit is that government might react to growing macroeconomic 
imbalance by refraining from increase of budget deficit not to worsen such development. 
                                                 
15 Along the predicted path of government budget deficit, each PEP and CoPr obligatorily includes 
macroeconomic prediction on which the budget prediction is based. 
- 16 - Given three PEP and two CoPr submissions, we have four measures of revision for 
budget balance and growth for each NMS. We organized the data to the panel and present 
estimated coefficients in the next table. 
Table 5: Determining factors of budget revisions 













































0,40       0,48 0,59 
Note: Dependent variable is average budget revision between two documents presented to EU (positive 
values for better budget position). GDP_R is average change in predicted growth rate between the 
same two documents (positive values for better growth prospects). EL is dummy variable with values of 
unity when general parliamentary elections took place between the submissions of documents. P_MF is 
index of power of finance minister taken from Gregor (2004) (higher values signify stronger MF). COH 
is index of government fractionalization taken from Gregor (2004) (higher values signify cohesive 
governments). CA is change in current account deficit (positive values for improvement). Random 
effect panel data estimation (unambiguously implied by Hausman statistics on standard levels of 
significance). Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant on 1 %, ** significant on 5 % and * 
significant on 10 %. 
Our findings suggest that both economic and political economy factors are behind 
NMSs’ budget plans revisions. As expected, improvement in growth prospects brings about 
also improvement in budget plans. Among political economy factors which cause 
improvement in planed budget position are more powerful MF and (combined with improved 
growth prospect) also less fragmented governments. On the other hand, occurrence of 
elections has negative effect on planed fiscal position. In our basic specification, estimated 
coefficient on change in current account deficit turned out to be insignificant and also 
negligible in its effect. 
Subsequently, we split our sample into EDP and non EDP countries. Growth-induced 
revisions seem to be more frequent in EDP countries as opposed to non EDP countries, for 
which coefficient on growth revision turned insignificant. According to our previous findings, 
negative election influence on budget plans is the issue of EDP countries only where also 
political fragmentation might be of concern. On the other hand, power of finance minister 
turns out to be significant in non EDP countries along with change of current account deficit 
for which negative estimated coefficient suggests that improvement in external 
macroeconomic balance is accompanied with loosening fiscal position. 
An unanswered question remains whether the tendency to revise the budget deficit 
trajectory will remain, especially in EDP countries, in the future. As a hint, we include the 
table 6 below which suggests that NMSs’ governments find it difficult to provide reliable 
fiscal forecasts. We compared outlined reduction in current expenditure in percentage of GDP 
between years 2004 and 2005 expressed in CoPr-spring and CoPr-autumn by each NMS. 
- 17 - Similarly, we calculated envisioned reduction of current expenditure between years 2005 and 
2006. Results averaged over EDP and non EDP countries are given in the table 6. 
Table 6: Envisioned expenditure reduction 
2005 2006 









Average -1,0 -0,3  0,7 
** -0,9 -1,0 0,1 
EDP 
average  -1,3 -0,5  0,8 
** -1,1 -1,3 0,2 
non EDP 
average  -0,4 -0,1 0,3  -0,5 -0,6 0,1 
difference  0,9 
** 0,4  0,6  0,7 
*    
Countries that revised their aspirations for 2005: CY; EE; HU; LT; MT; PL; SI; SK. 
Countries that reinforced their aspirations for 2006: CY; CZ; EE; HU; LT; MT; PL; SI. 
Note: Expected change in total current expenditure (total expenditure less capital 
formation and other expenditure) expressed in % of GDP. *** significant on 1 %, 
 ** significant on 5 % and * significant on 10 %. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CoPrs of NMSs 
In the spring of 2004, the NMSs expected on average a decrease in their total current 
expenditure in year 2005 by 1 % of GDP as compared to the year 2004. The EDP countries 
planned a reduction of 1,3 % of GDP while the non EDP countries had a more moderate goal 
of cutting expenditures of 0,4 % of GDP. A similar reduction of current expenditures (by 1,1 
% for the EDP and by 0,5 % for non EDP) was scheduled for 2006. 
However, when the NMSs submitted their CoPr-autumn things had changed. NMSs 
downgraded their commitments for year 2005, expecting to reduce their expenditure by only 
0,3 % of GDP. As one might have suspected, the EDP countries revised their commitments 
more significantly - by 0,8 % of GDP. The non EDP that had less ambitious targets for 2005 
in the first place, cut them still by 0,3 % of GDP. Eight out of ten NMSs, however, increased 
their plans for expenditures reduction in 2006. 
Given the fact that the EDP countries did not change their projections of budget 
deficits between CoPr-spring and CoPr-autumn (see tables 3 and 4 and chart 3b), they must 
have assumed higher tax revenues to compensate for a lack of expenditure cuts. Given 
relatively high tax revenues in the EDP countries, this strategy does not seem very pro-growth 
oriented. 
VI. RANKING FISCAL POLICIES IN NMSs 
Based on our findings, description of reforms, identified periods of consolidations, 
composition of NMSs’ budgets, application of growth accounting method, derivation of 
benchmark primary deficit compatible with constant debt to GDP ratio
16 and information 
outlined in PEPs and CoPrs, we developed overall index of quality of fiscal policy of every 
NMS. In this chapter, we describe criteria used and performance of each NMS with respect to 
those criteria. We also construct four additional sub-indexes, which are designed so as to 
capture stance of each NMS’s fiscal policy in particular areas. 
                                                 
16 Parts of the criteria we use here are based on our finding from Schneider and Zápal (2005), 
concretely, criteria no. 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14. 
- 18 - What has to be stressed is the fact, that construction and choice of criteria used is 
highly arbitrary and can be challenged on many grounds. Nevertheless, we believe that our 
ranking does help to differentiate among the NMS with respect to their fiscal policies.
17
Criteria no.1    Pension 
We assign one point to each NMS in case it has introduced a three pillar pension 
system and zero score to all other NMSs. We also add an additional point to those NMSs, 
which have their first pension pillar based on the defined contribution principle. 
Criteria no.2    Health 
We assign one point to each NMS which has undergone considerable health care 
reform and zero score to all other NMSs. 
Criteria no.3    EDP 
We assign one point to each NMS which has not been found to violate SGP after EU 
accession and thus has not been put under EDP and assign zero score to all other NMSs. 
Criteria no.4    Revision 
We rank NMSs according to average size of budget deficit revision between 
submissions of separate PEPs and CoPrs. Highest score is then assigned to NMS which 
revised its budget deficit least and lowest score to NMS which revised its budget deficit most. 
Criteria no.5    Speed 
We take outlined speed of budget deficit reduction four years ahead from CoPr-
autumn and subtract outlined speed of budget deficit reduction four years ahead from PEP01. 
We rank NMSs according to the difference and assign a highest score to NMS with the lowest 
difference and lowest score to NMS with highest difference. NMSs scoring worst are thus 
those who opted for fastest consolidation in CoPr-autumn relative to speed of consolidation 
outlined in PEP01. 
Criteria no.6    Dependency 
We take demographic dependency ratios in NMSs in year 2001 from European 
Commission (2003b) and rank NMSs accordingly. Highest score is assigned to NMS with 
lowest dependency ratio and lowest score to NMS with highest dependency ratio. 
Criteria no.7    Fertility 
We take fertility rates in NMSs in year 2003 from Orban and Szapary (2004) and rank 
NMSs accordingly. Highest score is assigned to NMS with highest fertility rate and lowest 
score to NMS with lowest fertility rate. 
                                                 
17 For those criteria, where we rank NMSs, we always assign a score of 2 to NMS with highest rank and 
lowest score of 0,2 to NMS with lowest rank. Technically, score is the multiple of 0,2 with the rank. While value 
of two can seem arbitrary, we thing it achieves balance between criteria where ranking is used and where score is 
assigned directly. Also, choice of different value other than 2 does not change out results significantly (more 
precisely, best and worst country is independent of choice of value used for multiplication and maximum change 
in overall position of NMSs for values used for multiplication ranging from 1 to 20 is two positions better or 
worse). 
- 19 - Criteria no.8    Benchmark 
We assign a score of one to each NMS with average actual primary deficit in period 
2000 through 2004 higher than benchmark primary deficit that ensures constant debt to GDP 
ratio. All other NMSs are assigned a zero score. 
Criteria no.9    Sustainability gap 
We calculate difference between actual and benchmark primary deficit calling it a 
sustainability gap. We then rank NMSs according to the size of our sustainability gap and 
assign highest score to NMS with lowest sustainability gap and lowest score to NMS with 
highest sustainability gap. 
Criteria no.10    Stabilizing function 
We count number of years a NMS displayed anti-cyclical fiscal policy over the period 
2001 through 2004 based on growth accounting method.
18 Then we count number of year a 
NMS displayed pro-cyclical fiscal policy over the same period. We rank NMSs according to 
difference between the two numbers, rewarding highest score to NMS with highest difference 
and lowest score to NMS with lowest difference. 
Criteria no.11    Fiscal stance 
We count number of year a NMS displayed restrictive fiscal policy over period 2001 
through 2004 (taking into account values of net fiscal effort above unity) and number of years 
NMS displayed expansionary fiscal policy. We than rank NMSs according to difference 
between the two numbers, assigning highest score to NMS with highest difference and lowest 
score to NMS with lowest difference. 
Criteria no.12    Room to manoeuvre 
We calculate average ratio of general government revenue to GDP in period 2001 
through 2004 and rank NMSs accordingly. Highest score is given to NMS with lowest share 
of revenue in GDP and lowest score is given to NMS with highest share of revenue in GDP. 
Criteria no.13    Consolidations 
We calculate number of successful consolidations and subtract number of unsuccessful 
consolidations ranking NMSs according to the difference. Highest score is then given to NMS 
with highest difference and lowest score to the NMS with lowest difference. 
Criteria no.14    Ability to manoeuvre 
We rank NMSs according to share of open-ended expenditure in their budgets. 
Highest score is assigned to NMS with lowest share of open-ended expenditure in its budget 
and lowest score to NMS with highest share of open-ended expenditure in its budget. 
                                                 
18 For details and results, see Schneider and Zápal (2005). 















































































































































































no.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14 
CY  0  1  0  0,2 0,8 2,0 2,0  1  1,6 1,2 0,4 1,4 1,0 0,4 
CZ  0  0  0  0,4 0,6 1,2 0,2  0  0,2 1,2 0,4 1,0 0,2 2,0 
EE  1  1  1  2,0 1,8 0,2 1,6  1  2,0 1,2 1,2 1,6 1,6 1,6 
LV  2  1  1  1,4 1,6 0,4 0,8  0  1,0 1,2 1,2 1,8 0,2 1,4 
LT  1  1  1  1,6 1,0 0,8 0,8  0  1,2 0,8 0,4 2,0 1,6 1,0 
HU  1  0  0  0,6 1,4 0,6 1,4  1  1,8 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,6 1,2 
MT  0  1  0  0,8 0,2 1,4 1,8  0  0,4 0,8 1,6 0,8 1,6 0,2 
PL  2  1  0  1,8 0,4 1,6 0,8  0  0,8 1,2 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,6 
SI  1  1  1  1,0 1,2 1,0 0,6  0  1,4 0,4 1,6 0,2 1,0 0,8 
SK  2  1  0  1,2 2,0 1,8 0,4  0  0,6 0,4 2,0 1,2 1,0 1,8 
Besides computing overall index for fiscal policy, we developed four sub-indexes. 
First sub-index captures reforms efforts of a NMS and is sum of scores for criteria no. 1, 2, 11 
and 13. We call first sub-index reform efforts. 
Second sub-index captures impact of demographic ageing on fiscal policy in a NMS 
and how is it shielded from it and is sum of scores for criteria no. 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12 and 14. 
We call this index ageing impact. 
Third sub-index captures whether fiscal policy in NMS performed its functions in 
stabilizing economy and in providing stable economic environment and is sum of scores for 
criteria no. 10, 11 and 13. We call this index fiscal functions. 
Last sub-index captures how fiscal policy and policy-makers in NMS stood against 
SGP criteria, sustainability of their fiscal policies, how they dealt with possible problems and 
how successful they were and is sum of scores for criteria no. 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 13. We 
call this index past behaviour. 
Table 8: Ranking fiscal policy in NMSs 
  Reform 
efforts  Rank  Ageing 
impact  Rank Fiscal 
functions Rank Past 
behaviour Rank  Total  Rank
CY 2,4 3 9,4 9 2,6 4 6,2 5  13,0  6 
CZ 0,6 1 4,6 1 1,8 2 3,0 1 7,4 1 
EE  4,8  9  10,0 10  4,0  9  11,8 10 18,8 10 
LV 4,4 7 8,4 7 2,6 4 7,6 7  15,0  8 
LT  4,0 5 7,8 6 2,8 6 7,6 7  14,2  7 
HU 2,0 2 7,6 5 1,2 1 6,0 4  10,8  3 
MT 4,2 6 5,6 2 4,0 9 5,4 3  10,6  2 
PL  3,8 4 7,2 4 2,0 3 5,0 2  11,4  4 
SI  4,6 8 6,0 3 3,0 7 7,6 7  12,2  5 
SK 6,0  10  8,8 8 3,4 8 7,2 6  15,4  9 
Note: Highest score implies higher rank and denotes “better” fiscal policy. 
- 21 - Although rank of individual NMSs according to various sub-indexes varies, taking all 
the criteria as a whole gives relatively clear picture. There is a group of countries with 
responsible fiscal policy and strong reform efforts where Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovakia belong. On the other hand, there is a group of countries with irresponsible fiscal 
policy making and lax approach to reforms, where Czech Republic, Malta and Hungary 
belong based on the overall index. The Czech Republic stands out as an outlier, with the worst 
results in most indicators and almost no demonstrated reform activity. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Summarising our analysis of politics of fiscal consolidations, we have seen that many 
NMSs implemented important reforms over the past years probably most important being 
pension systems reforms. Some of the NMSs have an impressive reform record behind them, 
reforming most of the public budget programmes and reaping benefits of reforms in balanced 
and sustainable budgets. But also many important steps remain to be done. Apart from rather 
slow progress in health care system reforms in many countries, there seems to be a need to 
reduce generosity of public sector wages and social benefit systems that repeatedly put a 
strong pressure on public finance in many NMSs and have been a source of unexpected 
budgetary developments. Many reforms also display low quality of implementation burdened, 
above all, by political disputes. 
Evidence from PEPs and CoPrs shows further that EDP countries revise their budget 
deficits more often and by larger values than non EDP countries, aiming subsequently for 
stronger future consolidations. Such practices allowed governments in EDP countries to 
postpone politically costly consolidations, implementing stop-and-go strategy later on. 
Measures implemented just before or after EDP initiation show clear focus on bringing 
budget deficits under control. Many these consolidations, however, seem to rely on abrupt 
measures and neglect a long-term perspective of coherent and comprehensive reforms. Due to 
this these consolidations might be hard to sustain politically. 
Fiscal outlook in several NMSs is rather worrying in this context. The NMSs expect to 
run deficit of about 2 % of GDP in 2006 which gives them much smaller margin for fiscal 
policy relaxation. Given the NMSs’ problems in managing fiscal policy and their inclination 
to run pro-cyclical fiscal policies, odds are not very promising. Moreover, if the NMSs do 
qualify for the EMU membership, political will to keep fiscal deficits under control may fade 
as it did in the EUR-15 countries and then the NMSs may face high deficits again. 
We believe that the two latter effects, i.e. the tendency of postponing structural 
reforms and potential malaise following the expected EMU membership, may make for a 
dangerous brew, especially in the already troubled EDP countries. These six countries 
(Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Malta, Cyprus, the exception being Slovakia) demonstrate 
their failure to put fiscal policy in order even at time of exceptionally supportive environment: 
economic performance has been relatively robust in last few years and the countries are 
motivated by cherished EMU membership. Still, they run fiscal deficits averaging 4 % of 
GDP. One may just fear how high these deficits may become in a few years time… 
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